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Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee. In the seventeen years since
enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the scope and size of the industry has
grown dramatically. Our understanding of good gaming regulatory policy has developed
substantially. And experience has brought to light serious flaws in IGRA that must be
addressed if Indian gaming is to remain a well-regulated industry and a useful resource to
tribal governments.
There is a striking divergence between the expectations of the Congressional authors of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the actual practice that has developed during the last
seventeen years.
I will address, first, the unexpected distribution of regulatory
responsibilities between the federal, state and tribal governments, and discuss the ways that
IGRA ought to be amended to deal with the current reality of gaming regulation. Second, I
will explain why I believe that one of IGRA’s most glaring failures is the well intentioned but
unworkable and ultimately harmful scheme addressing review of gaming management
contracts. I will offer a suggestion as to how to improve the effectiveness of NIGC contract
review and simultaneously lower the costs of gaming related services to tribes by eliminating
unnecessary uncertainty in the business climate created by these provisions. Finally, in
keeping with the uncertainty theme discussed in critiquing the NIGC contract review
provisions, I will address the problem created by uncertainty as the legality of Class II
technological aids in light of the ambiguity of the application of the Johnson Act.
I. THE NEED TO SHORE UP NIGC AUTHORITY AND TO GUARD AGAINST
THE THREAT OF REGULATORY CAPTURE OF TRIBAL REGULATORS.
Because of its unsavory past and its questionable moral pedigree, gaming has correctly been
subject to tremendous regulatory scrutiny. As one former federal prosecutor from Nevada
testified in 1987 in the early Senate hearings on Indian gaming regulation, “the respectability
of gaming is hard won and easily lost . . . the smallest scandal has ripple effects throughout
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the industry.”1 Even more than in other industries, proper regulation is fundamental to the
survival of the gaming industry.
Because of the tremendous value of gaming to Indian tribes, Congress and Indian tribes
have an even greater interest in insuring that gaming on Indian reservations, in particular, is
well regulated. As a result, providing for the proper regulation of Indian gaming was a
primary focus of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
When IGRA was enacted, it was anticipated that tribes and the federal government would
regulate Class II gaming (that is, bingo, pull tabs and similar games) and that states and tribes
would regulate Class III casino-style gaming through relationships worked out through
tribal-state compacts. In many respects, the division of authority anticipated by Congress in
1988 never materialized.
A. T H E R OL E

OF

S TAT E S

IGRA was enacted at least partially at the behest of states that asserted legitimate regulatory
concerns about Indian gaming. In preparation for my testimony, I reviewed some of the
hearing testimony from 1987. At that time, numerous witnesses testified that states would
make better primary regulators of Class III casino-style gaming, primarily because state
governments were performing such regulatory functions well in Nevada and New Jersey.
Moreover, since state governments are physically closer to tribal casinos, commentators
argued that they would provide a stronger regulatory presence. The compromise that was
ultimately hammered out and that became law allowed states to take a regulatory role over
Class III casino style gaming if they negotiated such a role in tribal-state compacts. Indeed,
IGRA expressly anticipated that states would negotiate for robust regulatory roles.
By and large, however, the states have been no-shows in Indian gaming regulation. With a
couple of notable exceptions, such as Chairman McCain’s home state of Arizona, state
governments never took up the mantle of tribal gaming regulation. This is curious in
hindsight. One of the most persistent positions taken by state officials during the debate
over federal Indian gaming legislation was the concern that Indian gaming be well regulated
and the subtext was that states needed substantial regulatory authority over such gaming to
insure that it was. Yet, when IGRA gave states an opportunity to address this problem head
on in tribal state-compacts (by regulating tribal gaming and assessing tribes lawful regulatory
fees to cover the costs), states widely declined to assert the powers that they had most
aggressively sought.
B. T H E A M B I G U O U S R O L E

OF THE

NIGC

Because of the vacuum in state regulatory leadership in Indian gaming, the NIGC and the
tribes sought to meet this important responsibility themselves. By and large, the federaltribal partnership has been adequate. The divergence between Congressional expectations
and regulatory reality, however, has created a couple of problems. First, the scope of the
NIGC’s authority over Class III casino style gaming is unclear. NIGC authority was greatest
over Class II gaming; NIGC authority was thought to be more circumscribed over Class III
1
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gaming because the states were expected to fulfill that role. According to this theory, the
Congress that created the NIGC likely anticipated that it was creating a National Indian Bingo
Commission and not really a National Indian Gaming Commission. Thus, while the NIGC
has stepped into the breach created when the state governments failed to show up, the tribes
have often questioned the legitimacy of the NIGC authority over Class III gaming. As a
practical matter, NIGC authority has usually been adequate to confer authority over Class III
gaming because most tribes that conduct Class II gaming also conduct Class III gaming.
While Class II gaming thus gives the NIGC an adequate regulatory hook, this explanation
has not been unsatisfactory to the regulated industry, which views the NIGC as overreaching.
To explain the importance of the legitimacy question, let me offer one fundamental truth
about regulated industries. Regulated communities rarely like to be regulated. No one likes
Big Brother looking over his or her shoulder. AT&T does not like the FCC looking over its
shoulder; used car dealers do not like the state attorneys general looking over their shoulders;
and Goldman Sachs likely does not like the SEC looking over its shoulder. It is a natural
reaction.
Tribal lambasting of the NIGC sounds different because it often takes on the language of
tribal sovereignty. If one strips away the sovereignty rhetoric, however, the complaints are
little different than those raised in any regulated industry. Consider, for example, the
controversy in the financial industry regarding Sarbanes-Oxley. One of the key areas of
dispute regarding Sarbanes-Oxley is Section 404 of that law which provides for mandatory
auditing of internal controls for financial reporting of publicly traded companies. This issue
bears a striking resemblance to the substance of the dispute over NIGC authority to apply
the Minimum Internal Control Standards to Class III gaming. Neither tribal casinos nor
corporations wish to endure the expense or the trouble of reporting their internal control
failings to a regulatory body, or to the constituents to whom they ought to be accountable,
whether they are stockholders of a corporation or members of the Indian tribe. As
sovereign nations, tribes are entitled perhaps to a greater level of clarity than ordinary
businesses when they are subjected to federal legal requirements. The bottom line, however,
is that no business likes to be regulated.
Given the natural skepticism by any regulated community, it is imperative that regulators
have a clear mandate. Because it is in the best interest of tribal gaming for an objective
regulatory agent to oversee all significant Indian gaming, Congress should strengthen the
NIGC’s mandate in this area. Recommendation: Congress should clarify that NIGC
authority over Class III gaming is as broad as it is over Class II gaming.
In sum, states, by and large, have been no-shows in the regulation of Indian gaming; the
NIGC has worked hard, but its authority related to Class III casino-style gaming has been
challenged as uncertain and illegitimate. There is, however, another key player in the
regulation of Indian gaming: tribal gaming regulators.
C. T H E P O T E N T I A L O B S TAC L E S

TO

S U C C E S S F U L T R I BA L R E G U L AT I O N

In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress presumably did not anticipate that the utter
absence of state regulatory authority, or the ambiguity of federal authority, would require
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tribal regulators to take such a pervasive role in regulating Indian gaming. Indeed, while
Congress imposed on Indian tribes numerous responsibilities, IGRA did not call for – and
did not require – that Indian tribes have tribal gaming commissions. To be sure, Congress
contemplated that Indian tribes would exercise some sort of regulatory authority over Indian
casinos, but it was left to the tribes themselves to figure out how best to go about exercising
that authority. The heavy reliance on tribal gaming regulators was not only unexpected by
Congress, it poses serious risks from the standpoint of sound regulatory policy that are not
addressed in the existing language of IGRA.
Indeed, the uneasy relationship between the regulator and the regulated community
mentioned above is true for tribal gaming regulators as well. Tribal casinos may not
appreciate being regulated, even by tribal regulators. And one of the problems, of course, is
that a regulated community can sometimes get upset at the manner in which a gaming
commission regulates. One potential problem, which this Committee has heard about
before, is that tribal gaming regulators often lack the legal separation that allow them to act
independently of the casino itself or the tribal government.
To be effective, tribal gaming regulators must focus with singular clarity, like a laser beam, on
their responsibility to maintain the integrity of Indian gaming. A tribal regulator who lacks
independence may be influenced by the tribal government to take action that is politically
expedient but inappropriate from a regulatory perspective. It may be influenced by casino
managers to take action that helps the short-term financial interest of the casino managers,
but is inconsistent with sound regulatory policy. To provide a concrete example, consider a
tribal council member who leans on the regulator to approve a license application for
someone who lacks the character traits that would make him suitable to be involved in a cash
intensive gaming operation. Or consider also a casino manager that cuts regulatory corners
to save money and asks the tribal gaming regulator to turn a blind eye to such actions. Such
risks may be avoided if the regulators act independently and objectively, but not if they fear
for their jobs. In a sound regulatory scheme, regulators must not be concerned with pleasing
those who are responsible for tribal economic or political interests, but must act solely
pursuant to legitimate regulatory interests.
While this may sound like a criticism of Indian tribes or Indian gaming, it seeks only to
recognize that the Indian gaming industry is not fundamentally different than other
industries with regard to the dynamics of regulation. We can expect as a structural matter
that Indian casinos will chafe at regulation like all businesses do. We must therefore create
regulatory structures that protect the independence of tribal regulators.
Here, the academic literature on “regulatory capture” is relevant. “Regulatory capture” is the
term used to define a regulatory agency’s tendency to collude with the firms it is ostensibly
regulating, to the detriment of the public interest. The academic literature on this subject is
rich and diverse. It tends to support the notion that a regulated community will attempt
influence the regulator to prevent the regulator from enforcing vigorously the regulatory
regime with which he is entrusted. Some scholars say “capture” is unavoidable: regulators
will become instruments of the regulated community and will inevitably act in favor of the
regulated community even when it is against the public interest. Others take a pragmatic
view that “capture” will exist to a greater or lesser degree depending on the legal structures
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that are used to guard against it, but that the threat of capture can be managed with prudent
laws and sound regulatory structures.
Upon reviewing the literature on regulatory capture, one can conclude that the structure of
Indian gaming markets renders tribal gaming regulators tremendously vulnerable to capture.
One risk factor for capture is a high degree of discretion by regulators. Broad discretion not
only creates the opportunity for regulators to rule in favor of the regulated community, but
also provides cover for doing so because the essence of discretion is power unconstrained by
enforceable legal authority. The regulation of gaming almost always involves a high degree
of discretion by regulators. Consider that many gaming regulators assert as a legal matter
that their discretion to grant or deny gaming licenses is unfettered by requirements of
providing due process because involvement in gaming is not a right, but a privilege. Though
such a legal argument is less compelling under modern notions of due process, it is widely
held among gaming regulators and it serves to justify enormous unchecked discretion in the
hands of the gaming regulator. Such discretion is deemed to increase the risk of capture.
Another risk factor relates to the number of groups interested in the regulator’s
performance. A regulatory agency that has many regulatory entities within its jurisdiction
and many other interested groups interested in its work is less likely to succumb to capture
by any one group, because it will be held accountable to some degree by each of the entities
and interested groups and each will scrutinize agency action. So, for example, when the FCC
makes a decision related to a communications license, AT&T, MCI and Sprint may cry foul
if Qwest gets favorable treatment that the others perceive as unfair. Such competition
within the regulated industry makes the regulator more accountable and thus serves as an
important check on regulatory capture. In contrast, many tribal regulatory agencies have
authority over only a single entity. Such regulators will not face the same kind of scrutiny
that other regulators will face; they will face less scrutiny and will hear only one voice, rather
than many, when they make regulatory decisions. Likewise, while outside interest groups can
sometimes have an impact in preventing capture, there are few independent interest groups
looking out for tribal members or casino patrons in the Indian gaming industry.
As a result, regulatory capture is a serious risk within the Indian gaming industry. To combat
some of these dangers, the NIGC has developed a bulletin that urges tribes to create
independent gaming commissions that will insure the proper regulation of Indian casinos.
The bulletin sets forth some of the best practices in the industry and the modern thinking as
to sound regulatory policy, but the bulletin does not carry the force of law. I would
encourage the Committee to consider enacting laws to address the independence of tribal
gaming regulators.
I would note that even a fully independent tribal gaming commissions may not remain free
of the risk of capture if it works in a closed system in which a commission regulates only
one entity. Thus, it is important to have an independent authority, outside of the influence
of the tribal government, that independently evaluates and perhaps oversees tribal regulatory
policy-making and decisions. The obvious candidate for such a role is the NIGC, though an
autonomous quasi-governmental body or a multi-tribal organization might be able to
provide some independent oversight of decisions by tribal gaming commissions to
discourage regulators from engaging in questionable behavior.
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While one might wish to see such an argument justified by a lengthy catalogue of serious
problems that have occurred because of the lack of an effective regulatory structure, a
“parade of horribles” has not materialized. With a few exceptions, the Indian gaming
industry has had few serious regulatory problems. Tribal gaming regulators have generally
shown that they are up to the task of being primary regulators and have implicitly
demonstrated that state regulators are unnecessary. However, the industry has grown
explosively, and such rapid growth is bound to come with growing pains and strains on a
regulatory structure that has serious flaws. Congress should not wait for serious problems to
develop before correcting these flaws and shoring up the regulatory structure.
Recommendation: Congress should require independent tribal gaming commissions
and should expand NIGC oversight authority and capability, especially over those
tribal casinos that decline to create effective and independent tribal gaming
commissions.
The changes I advocate, clarifying NIGC authority and creating a positive legal requirement
for independent tribal gaming commissions and additional independent oversight, are sound
as a matter of regulatory policy and would safeguard the regulation of this rapidly growing
industry.
II. ADDRESSING THE NIGC’S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
The management contract review process provides another example of reality diverging
from Congressional expectations expressed in 1988. These provisions may represent IGRA’s
most spectacular failure.
IGRA’s management contract provisions recognized that Indian tribes would contract with
outsiders to run casinos. Given that the commercial gaming industry in Nevada and
elsewhere had been largely successful in ridding this cash-intensive industry of the influence
of organized crime, Congress enacted the management contract review provisions to insure
that a federal agency, not the tribe, would scrutinize the outside parties who contract with
tribes to run Indian casinos. In other words, Congress did not want organized crime figures
that had been banished from commercial gaming (or other bad actors) to target Indian
gaming operations.
Congress also sought to insure that outside parties did not take advantage of tribes and walk
away with the lion’s share of gaming revenues. To insure that Indian tribes were the primary
beneficiaries of Indian gaming, Congress capped revenue participation by outside investors
at a maximum rate of 30 percent of net gaming revenues over a maximum five year term (it
allowed a revenue participation of up to 40 percent and up to a seven year term in
extraordinary circumstances).
Seventeen years later, it is patently obvious that these provisions did not have the intended
effect. Though more than 200 tribes currently engaging in Indian gaming, the NIGC has
approved only about 45 management contracts between tribes and outside parties. The low
number of approved management contracts is not a sign that Indian tribes are constructing
and operating gaming operations alone and independent of outside assistance. Rather, most
outsiders that do business with Indian tribes have found vehicles other than management
contracts to become involved in Indian gaming. Parties have worked to avoid the
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management contract review process and have been creative in drafting arrangements that
give the outsiders tremendous revenue participation in Indian casinos, yet without any
federal regulatory scrutiny.
I would argue that the management contract review process was a failed experiment and that
the underlying issue presents a serious problem that ought to be more closely examined.
Solving this problem requires, first, examining the reasons that parties seek to avoid the
NIGC management contract review process.
Parties may wish to avoid NIGC scrutiny for a variety of reasons. Some may wish to hide
checkered backgrounds or criminal records that would prevent them from being involved in
Indian gaming if they were subject to a suitability determination. Other parties may seek to
evade the NIGC review process for more legitimate reasons, such as the inordinate length of
time for NIGC review and the uncertainty of the outcome, as well as the uncertainty of the
legality of the contract pending review. The review process is difficult for the outsiders who
subject themselves to it. During the review process, these outside contractors must tie up
millions of dollars that could be invested elsewhere, all the while facing substantial
uncertainty as to the outcome of the process. Often, they must renegotiate contracts in
mid-stream to satisfy the NIGC. The result is that many potential participants in Indian
gaming decide to leave Indian gaming and pursue less risky ventures. Because of the smaller
pool of parties willing to bid on tribal gaming business, tribes face a less competitive market
from which to draw talent and they pay higher prices for that talent. In other words, the
lengthy and uncertain review process obstructs the free market that otherwise would have
developed for the provision of gaming-related services. As a result, tribes pay a premium
created by the risks and delay created by the regulatory structure.
The NIGC has also been frustrated by its inability to scrutinize contracts other than
management contracts. Because it has a legitimate concern about its obligation to maintain
the integrity of Indian gaming and to protect Indian gaming against outsiders who pose a
threat to the industry, it has searched for means of addressing the problem. It has recently
asserted a new legal theory to invalidate such contracts. In the last three years, the NIGC
has begun to argue that contracts that provide a substantial revenue share to an outside party
other than a management contractor violate the provision of IGRA that requires tribes to
insure that Indian tribes have the “sole proprietary interest” in Indian casinos. In other
words, the NIGC argues that substantial participation in casino revenues amounts to
ownership. One problem with this approach is that the NIGC has not adopted clear
standards to determine which kinds of provisions do – and which do not – violate the “sole
proprietary interest” principle. The lack of clear standards exacerbates the existing problem
of uncertainty that outside parties face related to regulatory approval and thus further
increases the risk premium for doing business with Indian casinos. As a result, the fees for
the services the tribes require – even under contracts subsequently found lawful – are higher
than the tribes otherwise might have had to pay.
Rational actors in the business community appreciate clear legal standards as to regulatory
requirements. Clear standards allow business entities to appraise the value of a business
opportunity and determine how much to bid for that work. In the absence of clear
standards, outside parties to tribal contracts face uncertainty and will charge tribes a
premium related to the perceived risk. If the risk is unquantifiable, outside parties may
-7-

April 27, 2005

refuse to bid at all, reducing the competition that otherwise might contribute to a favorable
economic environment for tribes. Currently, the uncertain regulatory climate related to
certain kinds of contracts creates a perception of high risk in entering gaming-related
contracts with Indian tribes. This uncertainty drives out some of the mature and
sophisticated gaming companies that would otherwise be willing to invest in Indian gaming
and creates opportunities in the industry for those who are comfortable with a high degree
of risk, such as the foreign investors that have had a high profile in several Indian gaming
operations.
NIGC scrutiny of management contracts and other gaming-related contracts has been
justified as an exercise of the federal government’s trust responsibility. However, the NIGC
lacks clear standards as to how to exercise such authority. Moreover, one major
development in the past seventeen years is the increasing sophistication of Indian tribes.
Congress recognized this sophistication in 2000 when it amended Section 81 (25 U.S.C. § 81)
to remove the requirement for Secretarial approval of tribal attorneys and their fees. Indeed,
there is a real question whether regulation of the fees charged by outside contractors and
paid by tribes ought to be regulated by the federal government at all. For several reasons, the
answer is likely to be negative.
First, the theory behind such regulation is based on dubious and out-dated economic
principles. The fee caps in IGRA’s management contract provisions are essentially price caps
imposed on the seller rather than the buyer. Price caps have fallen out of favor with
economists and government policy-makers as inefficient. Indeed, Chicago School price
theorists tell us that parties will generally sign contracts only when it makes both parties
better off. Any attempt by the government to regulate contracting with Indian tribes bears
the burden of explaining why this fundamental economic truth does not apply to Indian
tribes. If the argument is that tribes cannot make rational decisions, then the obvious
question is whether the federal government can make decisions better than tribes can. Since
it is tribes that must bear the costs of such contracts, it is likely that they are much better at
evaluating the costs and benefits than a disinterested federal decision-maker. Moreover,
because of the size of the Indian gaming industry, tribes now have access to a broader
spectrum of legal counsel and business advice. Most gaming tribes are able to obtain
substantial expertise that rivals or even exceeds the talent of government analysts. For runof-the-mill business decisions involving contracts for gaming services, the federal
government likely cannot make better decisions than tribes. In the main, federal regulators
should trust tribes to strike deals that are advantageous to them.
Second, in a legal environment shaped by the Indian trust fund debacle and numerous other
actions by federal officials, such as the unseemly acts documented in the Supreme Court’s
Navajo Nation case of 2003, the federal government’s legitimacy is in serious doubt when it
purports to make economic decisions on behalf of tribes. Even setting aside the question
of federal legitimacy when it purports to act on behalf of tribes, the tribes might be better
off making their own decisions with private counsel. If the tribe’s counsel commits
malpractice in advising the tribe as to matters related to tribal economic concerns, the tribe
may be able to sue the advisor. On the other hand, if the government errs in regulating
tribal economic decisions, the tribe may have difficulty obtaining any redress.
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Third, it is inevitable that insertion of federal regulators into tribal economic decisions will
slow economic development because it takes additional time after a deal is struck between
the parties for the government to perform its review. For reasons discussed above, this
dynamic may also increase the cost to tribes.
That is not to say that there ought not be a substantial role for federal regulators related to
such contracts. Rather than scrutinizing economic decisions, however, the federal
government can assist tribes best by independently scrutinizing the outside parties involved
in such deals.
Because of its nationwide and worldwide reach and its access to federal law enforcement,
the federal government has a tremendous comparative advantage over tribal regulators in
performing background investigations. One can easily imagine that a federal background
investigator, with federal credentials, will have greater access to information than a tribal
investigator who travels outside his jurisdiction. Moreover, with clear federal standards for
suitability, a person entering such contracts has a greater ability to evaluate the likelihood of
successfully completing the suitability review. Finally, the NIGC provides a greater safeguard
to Indian gaming because it is much less likely to suffer from capture-related myopia that
might afflict tribal gaming regulators.
To sum up, under the current regulatory regime, the NIGC’s authority is far too
circumscribed over licensure of outside people involved in Indian gaming contracts and yet
NIGC authority is far too broad over tribal economic decision-making. I would thus
encourage Congress to expand the NIGC’s role in the background investigation and
suitability context by extending the NIGC’s authority to conduct background investigations
and issue licenses to outside parties involved in Indian gaming. In sharpening the focus of
NIGC authority, Congress should also eliminate the role NIGC is currently playing in
regulating tribal economic decisions. Recommendation: Congress should give the
NIGC licensure authority over a wide range of persons involved in substantial
contracts related to the development and operation of Indian casinos and expand the
NIGC’s capability for conducting background investigations so as to minimize delay
in that proceess. At the same time, Congress should eliminate NIGC review of the
economic aspects of those agreements.
III. THE HIGH COSTS OF UNCERTAINTY
The NIGC contract review process is not the only area in which uncertainty plagues Indian
gaming and imposes tremendous costs on Indian tribes. The Department of Justice’s
persistent, unsuccessful attempts to apply the Johnson Act to Class II “technological aids”
also creates an atmosphere of uncertainty. Despite the Department of Justice’s repeated
losses in the federal courts of appeal, the threat of federal prosecution causes prudent
gaming companies to stay out of that market. In other words, the Department of Justice
has succeeded in driving out of the market only those companies that respect the
Department of Justice’s role in interpreting the rule of law, leaving the market dominated by
a few companies that are willing to operate in this legally gray area. As a result, the
companies with the largest involvement in Class II tribal gaming are those that are willing to
tread close to the thin line separating lawful and unlawful gaming. This approach has
rewarded these companies with extraordinary profits that would not be available in a market
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with full and open competition. These profits have come at the expense of Indian tribes
whose choices of business partners are constrained by the Department of Justice’s actions
and threatened actions.
Indian tribes and the entire Class II Indian gaming market are ill-served when reputable
companies refuse to enter the market. Tribes engaged in lawful behavior should be able to
work with reputable companies. In short, the Department of Justice interpretation of the
law has created a transfer of wealth from many relatively poor Class II gaming tribes to
those particular companies willing to operate in the shadow of the law.
The rule of law in Indian country is undermined by the ongoing dispute related to the lack
of clarity of the application of the Johnson Act to Class II technological aids. The
Department of Justice’s legal position is tenable only because Congress was not crystal clear
when it drafted IGRA. Congress should give the Department of Justice the clarity it craves
with regard to the applicability of the Johnson Act to Class II gaming involving
technological aids. Congress should indicate clearly that the Johnson Act does not apply to
Class II technological aids. This is a sensible solution to a problem that has festered for a
decade and has consumed hundreds of thousands of federal and tribal dollars in litigation
costs that could be better spent elsewhere. Recommendation: Congress should
explicitly indicate that all forms of Class II gaming recognized in IGRA are exempt
from the Johnson Act.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today.

***

Appendix - Publications by Professor Washburn on Indian Gaming:
The Mechanics of the Indian Gaming Management Contract Approval Process, 9 GAMING LAW
REVIEW 333 (2004) (explaining the lengthy process involved in the NIGC’s review of
gaming management contracts and discussing the relevance of “collateral agreements” in
this process).
Federal Law, State Policy and Indian Gaming, 4 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL 285 (2004) (Essay in
Symposium on Cross-Border Issues in Gaming) (describing the ultimate dependence of
tribal gaming on state law and state political processes).
Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYOMING LAW REVIEW 427 (2001) (describing
problems related to compacts, revenue-sharing, the Seminole Tribe decision, and the scope of
lawful gaming).
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